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SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY – THISDAYLIVE

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K BOLANLE ATI-JOHN analyses how market doctrine became a weapon against Africa’s development

The West told Africa to let the market decide. Now the West will not let the market decide.

That contradiction should no longer be treated as an academic curiosity. It sits at the centre of Africa’s modern development predicament. For more than four decades, African governments were told that prosperity required liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, subsidy removal, fiscal restraint, currency reform, trade openness and a reduced role for the state. These prescriptions arrived as economic wisdom, but also as conditions for loans, debt relief, donor support, creditworthiness and international approval.

The state was the problem. The market was the cure.

Yet the countries that preached this doctrine rarely practised it when their own power was at stake. The United States does not leave semiconductors to market forces. Europe does not leave clean technology, energy security or industrial competitiveness to chance. China never did. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore did not build modern productive strength by waiting for comparative advantage to do its magic. The wealthy and rising powers of the world have always known what Africa was encouraged to forget: markets are instruments of national strategy, not substitutes for it.

To call this hypocrisy is accurate but insufficient. Hypocrisy suggests inconsistency. What Africa experienced was more organised than inconsistency and more subtle than open domination. It was a structural conspiracy clothed in economic wisdom: not necessarily a conspiracy of whispered meetings and signed instructions, but a convergence of interests, institutions and ideas that worked in the same direction. Creditors wanted repayment. Donor governments wanted influence. Foreign firms wanted open markets. International institutions wanted policy conformity. Local elites wanted external legitimacy. Economists supplied the language. Together, they produced a doctrine that narrowed Africa’s options while appearing to offer neutral advice.

That is the first charge. Africa was not merely given policy advice. Africa was disciplined into a development doctrine that narrowed sovereign choice.

Structural adjustment was the great vehicle of this discipline. In the 1980s and 1990s, as debt, currency crises and balance-of-payment pressures weakened many African states, international financial institutions became not only lenders but policy architects. Their programmes often pushed trade liberalisation, market-determined exchange rates, public-sector retrenchment, privatisation of state enterprises and reduced industrial protection. Some of these reforms addressed real problems. Many African states had become fiscally reckless, administratively weak and deeply corrupt. But the cure too often became ideological: reduce the state first, ask questions later.

The record is not theoretical. Across Africa, structural adjustment programmes pushed tariff reduction, privatisation, exchange-rate reform and cuts in public expenditure as conditions for external support. In Zambia, copper privatisation under donor influence weakened national control over the commanding height of the economy. In parts of East Africa, premature liberalisation exposed textile and manufacturing sectors to competition they were not equipped to survive. In Nigeria, the structural adjustment era reoriented policy around currency reform, trade liberalisation and reduced state intervention, but did not produce the industrial transformation its advocates promised.

The result was not simply austerity. It was the thinning of Africa’s development imagination.

A generation of policymakers learned to speak the language of stabilisation more fluently than the language of production. Inflation, deficits, debt service, exchange rates and investor confidence became the commanding vocabulary. Factories, technology, research, logistics, engineering, industrial learning, supply chains and export capability became secondary. Macroeconomic stability matters. No country builds prosperity on fiscal disorder or currency collapse. But stability is not transformation. A country can stabilise poverty. It can balance accounts while industries die. It can satisfy creditors while its young people remain unemployed.

The second charge is historical dishonesty.

The public story told to Africa was that rich countries became rich by trusting free markets. The historical record says otherwise. Britain, the United States, Germany and France used tariffs, public finance, imperial preference, procurement, infrastructure and industrial support at different stages of their rise. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan used state coordination, technology acquisition, export discipline and directed finance. China combined markets with formidable state direction. The methods differed, but the principle was consistent: the state did not vanish. It shaped markets in service of national power.

Africa was told to abandon tools that others had used to build themselves.

To be fair, the language within development institutions has shifted since the high era of the Washington Consensus. Institutions, governance, resilience and even industrial policy are now discussed with more seriousness than before. But the structural legacy remains, and the policy freedom available to African states is still far narrower than the freedom rich countries reserve for themselves.

When rich countries protect strategic industries, they call it national security. When Africa does it, it is called distortion. When rich countries subsidise clean energy, it is called transition. When Africa subsidises production, it is called inefficiency. When rich countries use public procurement to support domestic firms, it is called resilience. When Africa attempts it, it is warned against protectionism. When powerful countries defend supply chains, it is called strategic autonomy. When Africa seeks to build local value chains, it is told not to interfere with the market.

This is not only hypocrisy. It is hierarchy.

The rules are not applied equally because the players do not have equal power. Strong countries can treat doctrine as flexible. Weak countries are told doctrine is discipline. Strong countries are allowed exceptions. Weak countries face conditionalities. Strong countries learn from policy failure. Weak countries are told that failure disqualifies them from ambition.

This is how sovereignty is narrowed without formal occupation.

Coercion no longer has to arrive in uniform. It can appear as a loan agreement, a policy benchmark, a debt restructuring, a donor conference, a country strategy paper, a credit-rating warning or technical assistance. The flag remains independent. The policy room contracts. The coercion is legal. The pressure is polite. The language is professional. But the consequence is unmistakable: a country retains the symbols of sovereignty while losing the freedom to choose the terms of its development.

The third charge concerns comparative advantage.

Africa was urged to specialise according to what it already had: raw materials, cash crops, minerals, low-cost labour and primary exports. But comparative advantage is not destiny. In Africa’s case, it was often history wearing the mask of economics. The continent’s inherited economic position was shaped by colonial extraction, infrastructure designed to move commodities outward, and trade patterns that rewarded raw exports more than domestic value creation.

To tell Africa to obey comparative advantage was often to tell Africa to remain where history had placed it.

Development is not the passive acceptance of what a country already produces. It is the deliberate creation of what a country has not yet learned to produce. It is the movement from cocoa to chocolate, crude oil to refined petroleum and petrochemicals, minerals to batteries, raw cotton to textiles, primary agriculture to processed food, ports to logistics power, data consumption to digital sovereignty, and imported machinery to domestic engineering capability.

No serious nation becomes wealthy by remaining permanently at the bottom of the value chain.

This is why premature liberalisation was so damaging. Trade openness can strengthen economies that already possess reliable power, competitive firms, skilled labour, patient capital, transport infrastructure, research institutions and capable regulators. But for countries without those foundations, rapid opening can destroy industries before they learn, scale and compete. That is not free competition. It is asymmetric exposure.

The fourth charge is that Africa was encouraged to distrust the very institution it needed to rebuild: the state.

This was not because African states were innocent. They were not. Many became corrupt, predatory, bloated and incompetent. They protected cronies, mismanaged public enterprises, borrowed badly and converted sovereignty into a shield for elite extraction. The complaint against external discipline is weakened every time African leaders use the language of nationalism to defend waste.

But the answer to a weak state is not permanent market submission. It is state-building. Every successful transformation required a state capable of planning, coordinating, regulating, financing, educating, securing and enforcing standards. Africa did not need a smaller state in the abstract. It needed a better state: disciplined, competent, technically skilled, accountable and developmental.

The developmental state is not a slogan. It is not state control for its own sake. It is not the protection of inefficiency. It is a state that can select priorities, support learning, mobilise long-term finance, punish failure, withdraw protection from incompetence and discipline both public officials and private capital. Successful industrial policy is not charity to domestic firms. It is a contract: support in exchange for performance.

That distinction matters because many earlier African state-led experiments failed not because the ambition was wrong, but because the institutions were weak. Protection became permanent. Subsidies became rents. Public enterprises became patronage machines. Political elites lacked the will or capacity to discipline beneficiaries. The lesson is not that Africa should abandon industrial policy. The lesson is that Africa must make industrial policy conditional, measurable and time-bound.

Such a state cannot be decreed by rhetoric. It requires a political settlement in which bureaucrats, investors, workers and national elites have more to gain from production than from extraction.

The fifth charge is intellectual capture.

The language of development was narrowed. “Reform” came to mean liberalisation. “Efficiency” came to mean privatisation. “Sound policy” came to mean fiscal restraint. “Openness” came to mean wisdom. “State intervention” came to mean distortion. “Protection” came to mean backwardness. “Industrial policy” came to mean danger.

Once language is captured, policy imagination follows.

This is why the most damaging legacy of market fundamentalism may not be any single privatisation, tariff cut or loan condition. It may be the quiet internalisation of a worldview in which African ambition must first seek external approval. A continent cannot transform itself if it must apologise for wanting to build steel, refine oil, process minerals, manufacture pharmaceuticals, own data infrastructure or protect food systems.

This does not mean Africa should confuse strategic insulation with permanent isolation. History shows that serious nations have often protected themselves, restricted exposure, controlled capital, sheltered infant industries and sequenced their engagement with the world while building internal productive strength. China did not rise by surrendering itself to the market. The United States did not build industrial power by practising the free-trade purity it later preached. The issue, therefore, is not whether Africa should look inward or outward. It is whether Africa can decide, on its own terms, when to protect, when to open, what to build, whom to partner with, and how to enter the global economy from a position of growing strength rather than inherited weakness.

That question is even more urgent in a multipolar world.

The West is no longer the only external force shaping African choices. China is now a major creditor, infrastructure builder, technology provider and commercial presence across the continent. Gulf capital, commodity traders, global private equity, technology platforms and new security actors also influence African policy space. This means Africa’s answer cannot be anti-Western resentment. The deeper question is not whether one external power is more benevolent than another. It is whether Africa can negotiate with all of them from a position of continental strategy.

Dependency can wear many flags.

China’s rise is instructive, but not because Africa should copy China mechanically. It is instructive because China never treated the market as a master. It used markets, foreign capital, technology transfer, infrastructure, export discipline and state coordination in pursuit of national transformation. Africa should draw the larger lesson: development requires strategic agency.

For Nigeria, the matter is not theoretical. No country of more than 200 million people should be content to export crude oil and import refined fuel, export agricultural produce and import processed food, export minerals and import machinery, consume foreign technology without building domestic capability, and rely on external platforms to secure its economy. That is not an economy organised for national strength. It is a dependency arrangement with a flag.

Nigeria needs an industrial doctrine worthy of its scale. Energy abundance. Refining and petrochemicals. Agro-processing. Steel and machinery. Defence production. Maritime logistics. Pharmaceuticals. Digital infrastructure. Regional manufacturing. Export capability. These will not emerge from slogans. They require power, ports, skills, finance, standards, procurement, security, research, execution and a state that can coordinate without suffocating enterprise.

The same applies continentally. Africa cannot bargain effectively as fragmented economies negotiating separately with creditors, donors, trading blocs and technology powers. The African Continental Free Trade Area will matter only if it becomes more than ceremony. It must become the platform for regional value chains, common standards, industrial corridors, infrastructure integration, capital formation and collective bargaining power.

Africa’s answer is developmental sovereignty.

That means rejecting both market fundamentalism and empty statism. It means using markets as tools, not idols. It means building states that are capable but constrained, ambitious but accountable, strategic but not predatory. It means attracting investment that deepens productive capacity, not merely extracts resources. It means protecting industries only where protection is tied to learning, productivity and export potential. It means opening markets according to sequence, not surrender. It means negotiating with the West, China and every other power without confusing partnership with dependency.

The title “Sleeping With the Enemy” is deliberately uncomfortable. It does not mean Africa’s enemy is a people, a civilisation or a geography. The enemy is a doctrine: the belief that Africa should surrender development strategy to market forces while powerful countries reserve the right to override markets whenever their own security, technology, industry or prosperity is at stake.

Africa slept with that doctrine for too long.

The time has come to wake up.

The West did not let the market decide when its own power was at stake. China did not. The successful late industrialisers did not. Africa should learn the lesson without bitterness and without illusion.

The market is a useful servant. It is a dangerous master. Africa’s next development era must begin with an act of intellectual independence: stop treating someone else’s doctrine as destiny.

Rear Admiral Ati-John (rtd) psc(+) fdc(+) is a Distinguished Fellow of the National Defence College, Abuja, and writes from Lagos.

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